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How to Do Things with Jurisdictions: Wales and the 
Jurisdiction Question 
 
Richard Percival* 
Senior Research Fellow, Cardiff University 
 
Introduction 
There is a recurring debate amongst lawyers and policy makers about the desirability of Wales 
becoming a separate, fourth, UK jurisdiction. The question has become one of immediate 
political and legal importance, as Wales moves towards its fourth distinct devolution settlement 
since 1999. Indeed, the demand for a separate jurisdiction became a key component of the 
opposition within Wales to what was widely seen as a botched attempt at introducing a 
UHVHUYHGSRZHUVPRGHOLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VGUDIW:DOHV%LOO, and the subsequent retreat by 
the Government from that draft. Whether the replacement, what will shortly become the Wales 
Act 2017, is a significant improvement remains an open question.1 
The policy question relies on an understanding of what we mean when we talk about a 
³VHSDUDWH MXULVGLFWLRQ´ for Wales. This in turn provides an opportunity to consider more 
JHQHUDOO\WKHFRQFHSWRI³MXULVGLFWLRQ´DIXQGDPHQWDOEXWOLWWOH-studied, feature of the structure 
of the law.  
My argument here is that what has become the orWKRGR[ DQDO\VLV RI ³MXULVGLFWLRQ-KRRG´ LV
flawed in ways that have unhelpfully limited the policy debate. As a result of the critical 
reception of the draft Wales Bill, WKLVRUWKRGR[\KDVVWDUWHGWRVKLIWZLWKWDONRID³GLVWLQFWEXW
QRWVHSDUDWH´ MXULVGLction for Wales.2 This shift is to be welcomed, but it is still far from an 
adequate recognition of the flexibility of the concept of jurisdiction, and what that flexibility can 
offer policy makers in the current debate. 
                                               
*  I am grateful for comments on drafts to the anonymous referee, Professor L E Talbot, York 
University; and Huw Pritchard, Cardiff University, and for information and other assistance to  
colleagues at the Wales Governance Centre, Cardiff University; Scott Wortley, Edinburgh University; 
Shea Coulson, Gudmundseth Mickelson LLP, Vancouver, British Columbia; Huw Davies, Welsh 
*RYHUQPHQW/HJLVODWLYH&RXQVHO¶V2IILFHAlix Beldam, Criminal Appeal Office; Denise Love, Military 
Court Service; Mark Ormerod CB, Chief Executive of the Supreme Court and Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council; Andrew Cayley CMG QC, Director of Service Prosecutions; and Philip Selth OAM, 
Executive Director, New South Wales Bar Association. 
1
 Wales Office, Draft Wales Bill (October 20, 2015). This article goes to press shortly before Royal 
assent, following the grudging consent of the National Assembly for Wales on January 17, 2017, but 
before third reading and motions reconciling Lords and Commons versions. References to the bill are 
to the final, post Lords report stage print, 2016/17 HL Bill 89. Reversing its previous position, the 
Welsh Government now supports a Welsh jurisdiction: Welsh Government, Draft Wales Bill Inquiry: 
written Evidence (November 26, 2015); Welsh Government, Evidence Submitted by the Welsh 
Government to the Commission on Devolution in Wales, (February 18, 2013). The UK Government 
DFFHSWHGWKHQHHGIRUD³SDXVH´WRUHFRQVLGHULWVDSSURDFK 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/amended-wales-bill-will-deliver-a-stronger-devolution-
settlement [Accessed January 18, 2017]. The Welsh Government subsequently published a draft 
*RYHUQPHQWDQG/DZVRI:DOHV%LOOZKLFKLQFOXGHGLWVDSSURDFKWRD³GLVWLQFWQRWVHSDUDWH´
jurisdiction: http://gov.wales/about/cabinet/cabinetstatements/2016/governmentandlaws/?lang=en 
[Accessed January 18, 2017]. 
2
 See particularly Wales Governance Centre, Challenge and Opportunity: The Draft Wales Bill 2015 
(February 2016). 
The orthodox view is determined by the perceived nature of the existing territorial jurisdictions. 
This has two aspects. First, it sees a monolithic, ubiquitous understanding of the jurisdictions 
of Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales as being the only model for a jurisdiction 
for Wales. On this understanding, unlike, for instance, federal structures, the whole of the law 
is the subject matter of a single territorial jurisdiction expressed in a single and distinct system 
of courts, whose reach is confined to, but ubiquitous within, the territory. There is no way for 
the law to express itself except through the lens of the three jurisdictions. Secondly, the point 
at which such a jurisdiction would arrive is not seen as being fixed in advance. Thus, it is said, 
a Welsh jurisdiction LVFDSDEOHRIDQGLQGHHG LV³HPHUJLQJ´ZLWKWKHJUDGXDODFFUHWLRQRI
differences in the substantive law between Wales and England and the development of 
distinctive legal institutions in Wales. The accretion of institutions, at some unspecified point, 
becomes a jurisdiction.3 
3DUWLFXODUO\ LQIOXHQWLDO LQ WKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI MXULVGLFWLRQ LV-RQHVDQG:LOOLDPV¶ important 
article Wales as a Jurisdiction.4 7KHLU GHVFULSWLRQ RI WKH ³WKUHH FRPPRQO\ DFFHSWHG
FKDUDFWHULVWLFV RI D MXULVGLFWLRQ´ KDV EHHQ ZLGHO\ adopted in the various reports of 
Commissions and committees that have considered the question from a policy perspective. 
7KRVHWKUHHFKDUDFWHULVWLFVDUH³DGHILQHGWHUULWRU\DGLVWLQFWERG\RIODZDQGDVWUXFWXUHRI
courts and legal institutions´ While it may (often but not always) be reasonable to describe 
WKHVHWKLQJVDV³FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´, in the sense of oft observed features, of a jurisdiction, they 
have been used ± LQERWK-RQHVDQG:LOOLDPV¶DUWLFOHDQGLQWKHSROLF\GHEDWH± as definitional. 
It is that use that is erroneous, and has been unhelpful in policy terms.  
Real life jurisdictions, both in the UK and elsewhere in the common law world, do not match 
this over-simplified, stereotypical notion of territorial jurisdiction. This qualification applies to 
each of the three Jones and Williams¶ characteristics.  
The first, a territory, is not something problematic or controversial in respect of Wales; but 
nonetheless it is important for the more general project ± the understanding of what it is to be 
a jurisdiction ± to consider it. I argue that the territoriality of the three UK territorial jurisdictions 
is significantly qualified in practice; and, more importantly, there are in addition a number of 
other jurisdictions by which the law of the UK is delivered.  
6HFRQGO\ ZKLOH WKHUH PD\ EH QR SRLQW LQ D VHSDUDWH MXULVGLFWLRQ XQOHVV LW DGPLQLVWHUV ³D
VHSDUDWHERG\RIODZ´LWLVQRWVWULFWO\QHFHVVDU\WKDWWKDWVKRXOGEHWKHFDVHFurther, there 
are plentiful examples of shared law between jurisdictions. 
7KHILQDOFKDUDFWHULVWLFLV³FRXUWVDQGRWKHUOHJDOLQVWLWXWLRQ´$FRXUWRUV\VWHPRIFRXUWVLV
indeed fundamental to the existence of a jurisdiction. %XWZKDWRI³RWKHU OHJDO LQVWLWXWLRQV´"
While a judiciary is a necessary implication of a court, jurisdictions can and do share a 
judiciary. There is no reason to suppose that separate legal professions are necessary, and 
the same is true for courts administration, or the many other disparate institutions sometimes 
claimed. 
Rather, I argue, a jurisdictionLQWKH³WHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQ´VHQVHrequires three sets of legal 
rules ± rules creating a court; rules providing a court with a judiciary, and finally rules setting 
out the reach of the court, that is, defining the disputes, questions, issues and authorisations 
which it is charged to decide. 
                                               
3
 For an illustration of this consensus, see National Assembly for Wales Constitutional and Legislative 
Affairs Committee, Inquiry into a Separate Welsh Jurisdiction, (2012), chapter 3.  
4
 [2004] P.L. 78. 
Having established an alternative view of what a jurisdiction is, I apply this approach to the 
possible options for a separate Welsh jurisdiction, which involves some consideration of the 
extent of devolution of responsibility for the law. 
7KHXVHVRI³MXULVGLFWLRQ´ 
7KHUHZDVYHU\OLWWOHGLVFXVVLRQLQ-RQHVDQG:LOOLDP¶VRULJLQDOSDSHURIZKDWDMXULVGLFWLRQis 
(as one would expect, as their primary concern was elsewhere). Jones and Williams do say 
LQDIRRWQRWHWKDWWKH\DUHFRQFHUQHGZLWKDQ³HPSLULFDO´DSSURDFKQRWDOHJDO-philosophical 
oneUHIHUULQJWRWKHGHEDWHDERXWD³V\VWHPRIODZ´LQSRVLWLYLVP.5  
It is clearly right to base the enquiry on the nature of existing jurisdictions. But to characterise 
the enquiry as empirical only takes us so far. It does not scrutinise the identity of the facts or 
institutions which are to be the subjects of the empirical enquiry. In the first place, this narrows 
the enquiry, which proceeds on the unstated basis that the existing territorial jurisdictions, as 
XQGHUVWRRGLQWKH8.ODZ\HU¶VZRUOGYLHZLVDQXQFRQWURYHUVLDOJLYHQ6HFRQGO\LWLQKLELWVRXU
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI WKH QDWXUH RI WKH HPSLULFDOO\ REVHUYHG ³FKDUDFWHULVWLFV´ LQ SDUWLFXODU
suggesting that each of the three is of equal significance or status. 
³¶-XULVGLFWLRQ¶´'LSORFN/-KDVVDLG³is an expression which is used in a variety of senses and 
WDNHV LWV FRORXU IURP LWV FRQWH[W´.6  It is common to talk of things like the limited statutory 
jurisdictions of some FRXUWVDQGWULEXQDOVDQGWKH³LQKHUHQWMXULVGLFWLRQ´RIWKH+LJK&RXUW$
court or, particularly, a tribunal may have a number of separate and distinctly identified 
³MXULVGLFWLRQV´7KH(QJOLVK First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber), for instance, is said to have 
118 jurisdictions, meaning that statute has conferred upon it the power to determine disputes 
in that many categories of case.7 Such narrow-band jurisdictions are characteristic of tribunals, 
charged with determining a precise and limited statutorily question. But ³MXULVGLFWLRQ´ LQ WKLV
sense also applies to broad-band courts. There is, for instance, a body of case law on when 
a court is acting without, or in excess of, jurisdiction, a consequence of which may be that its 
decision-makers are not acting judicially.8  
But the semantic core of these various usages is the same. The roots of the word are the Latin 
ZRUGVIRU³ODZ´DQG³WRVD\´RU³WRGHFODUH´ 7KHQRWLRQRI³MXULVGLFWLRQ´KDVWo do, in all cases, 
ZLWKWKHSURSHUUHDFKRIDFRXUWRURWKHUWULEXQDO$MXULVGLFWLRQLV³DOHJDOVSDFHRUVSKHUHRI
competence « WR KDYH MXULVGLFWLRQ RYHU D PDWWHU LV WR KDYH FRPSHWHQFH WR PDNH D
GHWHUPLQDWLRQZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKDWPDWWHU´9 
So without more, we can say that the description of a territory DVD³MXULVGLFWLRQ´LVDVHFRQGDU\
meaning of the word, referring to the territorial limits of the proper reach of the court or system 
of courts. Conceptually, it is not the political space that comes first and is then filled up with a 
system of courts. It is a court which comes first, and the space is defined as the limits of its 
determinative reach. Indeed, it has been argued that the territoriality of territorial jurisdictions 
is a relatively new phenomenon.10 )XUWKHU -RQHV DQG :LOOLDPV¶ WKLUG FKDUDFWHULVWLF OHJDO
institutions, bundles the essential institution ± a court (or system of courts) ± with other 
contingent, observed, characteristics of the existing territorial jurisdictions, like a legal 
profession, a judicial appointments system or a Law Commission. 
                                               
5
 7+-RQHVDQG-0:LOOLDPV³:DOHVDVD-XULVGLFWLRQ´[2004] P.L. 78, fn 1. 
6
 Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1968] 2 Q.B. 892 (CA), 889.   
7
 List supplied by the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber). 
8
 See, for instance, Re McC (A Minor) [1985] A.C. 528. 
9
 6KDXQQDJK'RUVHWW³¶6LQFH7LPH,PPHPRULDO$6WRU\RI&RPPRQ/DZ-XULVGLFWLRQ1DWLYH7LWOHDQG
7DQLVWU\´08/5 
10
 5LFKDUG7)RUG³/DZ¶V7HUULWRU\$+LVWRU\RI-XULVGLFWLRQ0LWFK/5HY 
The requirements of a jurisdiction: The territoriality of the territorial jurisdictions 
The orthodox picture of the monolithic and ubiquitous British territorial jurisdiction is extreme 
and inaccurate. The UK is not as simple as that. 
The reach of English and Welsh civil courts has always extended to rules allowing service of 
process outside the realm; and now includes the regulation of place of trial by the doctrine of 
forum non conveniens and the enforcement of choice of court clauses in contracts by various 
procedural means.11 
The criminal law is said to be more fundamentally territorial.12 But all three UK territorial 
criminal jurisdictions assume responsibility to try British citizens for murder (and culpable 
homicide) committed abroad, and the modern tendency has been to increase extra-territorial 
reach in contexts such as bribery, money laundering, fraud and genocide and crimes against 
humanity.13 
These may not fundamentally question territoriality, but they do begin to qualify it. The point 
goes further, however, if we look out to sea.  
The seaward boundary of the territorial jurisdictions is somewhat complicated, and different 
lines are drawn for different purposes. But even if the law is complicated, it does not 
conceptually challenge the notion that the territory of the territorial jurisdictions stops 
somewhere, albeit at different places in different contexts. 
But the seaward boundaries do present an interesting conceptual challenge if we go further 
RIIVKRUH7KH ³WHUULWRULDO VHD´H[WHQGV IRUQDXWLFDOPLOHV IURP EURDGO\ WKHVKRUH14 and 
constitutes part of the UK.  
It is clear that the UK stops at the seaward boundary of the territorial sea. Beyond that are 
international waters. But the UK as a state nevertheless exercises certain limited sovereign 
rights recognised in international and domestic law beyond that, to a limit of 200 nautical miles. 
This is now the Exclusive Economic Zone, designated under the Marine and Coastal Access 
Act 2009.15 The devolved administrations undertake functions in both the territorial area and 
this zone.16 
The Zone is clearly not territorially part of Scotland, Northern Ireland, or England and Wales. 
But nonetheless, UK statutes place obligations on people to do or not to do things there, 
disputes in relation to which must form the subject matter of cases in courts. 
For instance, there is, in the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009, a system of licensing of 
certain activities, including in part of the EEZ.17 In common with most licensing regimes, it 
                                               
11
 )RUDJHQHUDODFFRXQWRI³WKHWUDGLWLRQDO(QJOLVKUXOHV´VHHMcClean and Beevers Morris The 
Conflict of Laws (7 ed 2009) chapter 5, esp pp. 132-143. 
12
 See for instance Richardson (ed) Archbold 2015, para 2-35. 
13
 Offences Against the Person Act 1861, s. 9; Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s. 11; Bribery 
Act 2010, ss. 7 and 12; Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; Fraud Act 2006, Criminal Justice Act 1993, part 
1; International Criminal Court Act 2001; International Criminal Court (Scotland) Act 2001 asp 13. 
14
 $OOVHDZDUG]RQHVDUHPHDVXUHGIURPWKH³EDVHOLQH´ZKLFKLVWKHORZZDWHUPDUNVXEMHFWWR
special provision for bays and estuaries and to extension as a result of tidally-exposed land: see 
Territorial Waters Order in Council 1964 (as amended by the Territorial Sea (Amendment) Order 
1998, S.I. 1998/2564). 
15
 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2006, s. 41; Exclusive Economic Zone Order 2013. 
16
 Territorial Sea Act 1987; Territorial Sea (Limits) Order 1989 (S.I. 1989/482); Scotland Act 1998, s. 
126(1); Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 98; Government of Wales Act 2006, s. 158(1). For the Welsh 
Zone, see Government of Wales Act 2006, s. 158(1), as amended by the Marine and Coastal Access 
Act 2009.  
17
 Part 4 of the Act. 
makes provision for various associated criminal offences.18 Section 110 of the 2009 Act allows 
FULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJVWREHWDNHQLQ³DQ\SDUWRIWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP´So the criminal courts 
of each of the three territorial jurisdictions enjoy coterminous jurisdiction in respect of these 
offences, wherever in the zone they take place. Such an offence committed 13 miles off Cape 
:UDWK PD\ EH WULHG LQ D VKHULII¶V FRXUW LQ 6FRWODQG RU D PDJLVWUDWHV¶ FRXUW LQ DQ\ RI DQG
anywhere in) Northern Ireland, Wales or England. 
7KHVDPH$FWPDNHVSURYLVLRQIRUDV\VWHPRI³PDULQHSROLF\VWDWHPHQWV´ZKLFKPD\UHODWH
to both the territorial sea and the EEZ.19 There is a system of statutory challenges to the validity 
of the plans, not dissimilar to that in the planning system. Asymmetrically, the Act confers 
exclusive jurisdiction in relation to such challenges on the High Court of England and Wales if 
the plan is for an area in the territorial sea of England and Wales; but for everywhere else, 
MXULVGLFWLRQLVH[HUFLVHGE\³DQ\VXSHULRUFRXUWLQWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP´, that is, the High Courts 
in London or Belfast, or the Court of Session.20 The courts of all three territorial jurisdictions 
have the same jurisdiction, over the same part of the surface of the planet. 
One could claim that these expanses of water in some sense subsist as attenuated parts of 
Scotland, England and Wales, and Northern Ireland, each simultaneously with the other; or 
that they are deemed to be part of the territory associated with the court before which the case 
is heard for the duration of the proceedings (or the hearing, or the effects of a conviction). But 
to do so would be eccentric, even if not wholly incoherent. All one needs to say is that the 
jurisdictions of the specified courts extends to the relevant disputes there. 
UK jurisdictions 
Further, the territorial jurisdictions do not exhaust the reach of courts and tribunals in the UK. 
The UK services jurisdiction, for instance, does not have a fundamentally territorial basis at 
all. Now codified in the Armed Services Act 2006, the services jurisdiction applies to every 
member of the regular armed forces and reserve forces when acting as such,21 and certain 
civilians.22 
And in relation to tribunals, there are both UK and already-existing Welsh jurisdictions. The 
Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 created a First-tier Tribunal and an Upper 
Tribunal in a section extending to each of the parts of the United Kingdom. Both tribunals sit 
LQDQXPEHURIGLVWLQFW³FKDPEHUV´ZKLFKLQWXUQH[HUFLVHYDULHGVWDWutory jurisdictions. Many, 
but by no means all, of the jurisdictions relate to challenges to state action.23  
6RPH RI WKH 7ULEXQDOV¶ MXULVGLFWLRQV DUH 8. MXULVGLFWLRQV Vuch as those relating to tax, 
immigration and nationality. Of the seven chambers of the First-tier Tribunal, two comprise UK 
only jurisdictions ± the Tax Chamber and the Immigration and Asylum Chamber. The General 
Regulatory Chamber has UK, GB, England and Wales and England only jurisdictions. Outside 
this structure lie a number of first instance tribunals which have been recognised as devolved 
in Wales. The right of appeal, however, in respect of most of them remains to the Upper 
Tribunal. 
                                               
18
 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2006, ss. 85 and 89 
19
 Part 3 generally.  
20
 Marine and Coastal Access Act 2006, s. 62. 
21
  Armed Forces Act 2006 s. 367. 
22
 Armed Forces Act 2006 s. 370 and sch. 15 and Armed Forces (Civilians Subject to Service 
Discipline) Order 2009, S.I. 2009/836;  Armed Forces (Civilians Subject to Service Discipline) Order 
2009, S.I. 2009/836. There is a territorial element to the civilian jurisdiction. 
23
 See Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, Part 1, ch. 3, and orders made thereunder.  
The relationship between the UK tribunal system and the territorial jurisdictions illustrates the 
complexity of UK jurisdictions. From the Upper Tribunal, there is a right of appeal to the 
³UHOHYDQWDSSHOODWHFRXUW´ZKLFKLVRQHRIWKH(QJODQGDQG:DOHVRU1RUWKHUQ,UHODQG&RXUWV 
of Appeal, or the Court of Sessions. The Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 provides 
that the identification of the correct court is a matter for the Upper Tribunal, which specifies 
ZKLFKHYHURIWKHWKUHHRSWLRQVLV³WKHPRVWDSSURSULDWH´,QAdvocate General for Scotland v 
Murray Group Holdings Ltd, that court was the Court of Sessions, but the case involved 
consideration of English and Welsh trust and contract law. The Court of Sessions decided 
that, in such a case, the Scottish court had judicial knowledge of the law of England and Wales. 
The First-tier and Upper Tribunals had such knowledge; as would the Supreme Court on 
appeal. It would be ³KLJKO\DUWLILFLDO´LIWKH&RXUWRI6HVVLRQVGLGQRW. It would mean that the 
Scottish appellate court would have to treat that law as foreign, and would be constrained by 
WKHWULEXQDOV¶ILQGLQJVDVRIIDFWLQUHVSHFWRILW24 
We should not dismiss tribunal jurisdictions as of marginal relevance, merely because they 
are narrow-band tribunal jurisdictions, or because, to the extent they relate to citizen-state 
disputes, they necessarily follow the outline of the state itself. They show that the law of the 
UK is perfectly capable of being expressed via a jurisdiction not limited to the territorial 
jurisdictions.  
In any event, there is a more important UK jurisdiction to which these limitations do not apply. 
The Supreme Court was established by the Constitutional Reform Act 2005, section 41(2) of 
ZKLFKVWDWHVWKDW³DGHFLVLRQRIWKH6XSUHPH&RXUWRQDSSHDOfrom a court of any part of the 
United Kingdom, other than a decision on a devolution matter, is to be regarded as a decision 
RI D FRXUW RI WKDW SDUW RI WKH 8QLWHG .LQJGRP´ 7KH IROORZLQJ VXEVHFWLRQ SURYLGHV WKDW D
Supreme Court decision on a devolution maWWHU LV QRW ELQGLQJ RQ LWVHOI EXW ³RWKHUZLVH LV
ELQGLQJLQDOOOHJDOSURFHHGLQJV´7KLVGRHVWZRLPSRUWDQWWKLQJVLWFOHDUO\ORFDWHVWKH6XSUHPH
Court as being within each territorial jurisdiction when deciding ordinary cases from that 
jurisdiction (thus closing a dispute about the precedential effects of certain non-Scottish House 
of Lords decisions in Scots law). But it also, equally clearly, locates the Supreme Court outside 
the confines of the territorial jurisdictions when exercising its jurisdiction in relation to 
³GHYROXWLRQPDWWHUV´25  
The Supreme Court inherited this jurisdiction from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, 
on which it was conferred by the three original devolution statutes.26 The key function of the 
³GHYROXWLRQ PDWWHUV´ MXULsdiction is to police the powers of the devolved legislatures and 
executives. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Court has, for instance, delineated (albeit at 
times not entirely clearly) the contours of the Welsh settlements based on the Government of 
Wales Act 2006.27 
7KH³GHYROXWLRQPDWWHUV´MXULVGLFWLRQKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGE\3URIHVVRU1HLO:DONHUDVWKH³ELUWK
RI D FRQVWLWXWLRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´28 Lady Hale devoted her address to the Legal Wales 
                                               
24
 [2015] S.L.T. 765, [49] ± [50]. 
25
 Constitutional Reform Act s. 41(4). 
26
 Government of Wales Acts 1998 and 2006, s. 149 and sch. 9; ss. 99 and 112, Scotland Act 1998, 
s.98 and sch.6; s. 33 and Northern Ireland Act 1998, sch10; s. 1; transferred to the Supreme Court by 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, sch. 9, part 2. 
27
 Local Government Byelaws (Wales) Bill 2012 ± Reference by the Attorney General [2012] UKSC 
53; [2013] 1 A.C. 792; Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill ± Reference by the Attorney-General [2014] 
UKSC 43, [2014] 1 W.L.R. 2622; and Recovery of Medical Costs for Asbestos Diseases (Wales) Bill ± 
Reference by the Counsel General for Wales [2015] UKSC 3; [2015] 2 W.L.R. 481.  
28
 Neil Walker, Final Appellate Jurisdiction in the Scottish Legal System (2010), a report to the 
Scottish Government (2010). 
conference in 2012 to the experience of constitutional adjudication, and went so far as to say 
³WKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPKDV LQGHHGEHFRPHD IHGHUDO VWDWHZLWKD&RQVWLWXWLRQ UHJXODWLQJ WKH
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHIHGHUDOFHQWUHDQGWKHFRPSRQHQWSDUWV´ 
That may be going too far. But nonetheless, it is clear that the devolution matters jurisdiction 
it is not merely part of Scots, Northern Irish or English and Welsh law. It is not assimilable to 
the territorial jurisdictions, and thus stands apart from them. It is determinative in all 
proceedings (section 41(3)), and so stands above them. 
The requirements of a jurisdiction: judiciary 
If jurisdiction refers (at least) to the reach of a court, then a court is fundamental, and a court 
requires a judiciary. It is important, however, to note two points. First, the creation of a court 
or system of courts, and the provision of a judiciary are not the same thing. They involve 
distinct and separate legal steps. Secondly, the judiciary constitutes the court, not ± or not 
only ± the jurisdiction. The legal rules that provide a court with a judiciary do not exhaust the 
legal rules necessary to confer jurisdiction status.  
But a judiciary can be shared. One common site for such sharing is apex courts ± the top court 
in a system of multiple jurisdictions. But the nature of the law declared in such courts may 
differ. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council provides an extreme case of this sort of judicial 
sharing. It has long provided an apex court for British territories and in some cases their 
successor states. It still exercises thirty-six jurisdictions (seven of which are UK jurisdictions). 
At its likely peak in about 1922, it had very many more.29 
The position of the Supreme Court as a court of distinct jurisdictions is clear. Section 41(2) of 
the Constitutional Reform Act provides that when sitting on a case from one of the territorial 
jurisdictions, the Supreme Court is sitting as a court of that jurisdiction. In the Supreme Court, 
each of the three territorial jurisdictions (and others ± it is possible for UK service cases and 
UK jurisdiction cases from the Upper Tribunal to reach the Supreme Court) share the same 
judiciary. The sharing in this context is seamless ± the judges do not have to be distinctly 
appointed to each jurisdiction. 
The same may be true where a court has some statutory limit to its jurisdiction. It is, if not 
common, then far from unknown, for the England and Wales Court of Appeal to conclude that 
a matter is within the jurisdiction of the Administrative Court, and thereupon to formally 
constitute itself as the Administrative Court, if necessary waiving technical requirements, and 
determine the case, or a part of it, as the Administrative Court.30 
Another example of shared judiciary at appellate but not apex level is provided by the 
relationship between the Court of Appeal, Criminal Division and the Courts Martial Appeal 
Court. The Court of Appeal, Criminal Division may, on the same day, consider cases in that 
jurisdiction, then transform itself into the Courts Martial Appeal Court (applying the same law, 
largely) without any outward distinction, and decide a case from a court martial. As a matter 
of practice, only particular judges are used for court martial appeals, but all judges of the 
(England and Wales) Court of Appeal are automatically appointed to the Court Martial Appeal 
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Court. Judges of both High Courts, Scottish courts and others may also be appointed.31 At first 
instance, similarly seamless judicial sharing works the other way round: judge advocates of 
the services jurisdiction may, since 2012, sit as judges of the Crown Court.32 
Small jurisdictions may also allow for judicial sharing via the qualifications required for judicial 
appointment ± in Jersey, for instance, Court of Appeal judges and Commissioners, who 
preside over the Royal Court, must either be suitably qualified local lawyers, or from the UK 
jurisdictions (plus Guernsey or the Isle of Man), or commonwealth judges.33 The pattern in the 
Church of England canon law jurisdiction courts is not dissimilar.34 
In the Canadian system, the appointment of judges is instructive.35 The starting point is three 
constitutional provisions: first, section 96 of the Constitution Act 1867 provides that the 
DSSRLQWPHQW RI MXGJHV WR ³WKH 6XSHULRU 'LVWULFW DQG &RXQW\ &RXUWV LQ HDFK 3URYLQFH´ LV D
federal function. However, secondly, the provinces are responsible for the administration of 
justice in the province.36 7KLUGO\ WKH IHGHUDO 3DUOLDPHQW PD\ HVWDEOLVK D ³JHQHUDO FRXUW RI
DSSHDO IRU &DQDGD´ DQG ³DGGLWLRQDO FRXUWV IRU WKH EHWWHU DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI WKH ODZV of 
&DQDGD´37 
The result was that there was a three-tiered hierarchy within each Province, with a superior 
court, comprising both a court of appeal and trial divisions, local county or district courts, and 
inferior or provincial courts. The first two were kQRZQDV³VHFWLRQFRXUWV´DQGKDGIHGHUDOO\
appointed judges in provincially constituted, administered and managed courts. The latter 
were also provincially created and administered, but the judges were provincially appointed. 
During the course of the 1970s, the local and district courts were amalgamated with the 
superior courts, which all have trial and appeal chambers or divisions.38  
The provincial jurisdictions are more similar to UK territorial jurisdictions than those of 
American states, or Australian states or territories, in that the provincial courts, broadly, 
administer federal as well as provincial law.39  There is also a Federal tier, now comprising the 
Federal Court and the Federal Court of Appeal.40  
The Supreme Court is not just the apex constitutional court, but also operates as a final court 
of appeal from Provincial courts ± like the UK Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia, 
and unlike the Supreme Court of the United States.  
When the High Court of Australia acts as the final court of appeal, however, it is said that the 
ODZWKDWWKHFRXUWGHFODUHVLVDXQLILHG³FRPPRQODZRI$XVWUDOLD´,W LV WKXVQRW OLPLWHGDV
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January 11, 2016] 
binding precedent to the state or territory jurisdiction from whence the case originated.41 
Naturally, a decision on the construction of a state statute will only strictly apply to that statute, 
and therefore within that jurisdiction. But to the extent that the High Court declared the 
common law in such a case, that statement of the law would be of binding precedential value 
in each of the other states or territories. 
The requirements of a jurisdiction: legal professions 
In practice, a court or system of courts needs lawyers to bring cases in it, and to provide a 
pool for the selection of the judiciary. Each of Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and 
:DOHVKDYHGLVWLQFWEDUULVWHUV¶DQGVROLFLWRUV¶SURIHVVLRQVZLWKWKHLr own professional rules, 
educational systems and structures for practice. Lawyers may qualify in more than one 
jurisdiction, but it is not commonplace and will normally involve taking additional examinations 
and paying substantial fees.  
But this is not always the case. The UK services jurisdiction deals with rights of audience by 
means of the regulation of who people subject to service law may appoint as their legal 
representative. Rule 39 of the Armed Forces (Court Martial) Rules 200942 limits 
representatives to those with such rights in England and Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, 
and (broadly) lawyers in the Channel Islands, the Isle of Man, a Commonwealth country or a 
British overseas territory.43 Thus those practicing law in the majority of common law countries 
can exercise rights of representation and audience before a court martial without taking any 
additional formal step. 
In both Australia and Canada, barristers and solicitors in each of the states, provinces or 
territories have automatic rights of audience in each of the others, subject to minor limitations 
(in Canada, for instance, generally a member of the bar of one Province is limited to 100 days 
a year practice in another, before he or she must be called in the second Province, which in 
any event is a minor formal step).  
In Australia, this has been accomplished despite the fact that there are more substantial 
differences in the organisation of the professions between the states and territories in Australia 
than there are within the UK. In most states and territories, the two professions are fused, 
although in some an independent bar persists, while two states have fully independent 
professions, as in the UK.44 
Further, the Australian states and territories are also currently going through a process to 
adopt a Uniform Law which would apply a common professional regulatory structure: Legal 
Profession Uniform Law Application Acts were passed in New South Wales and Victoria 
(which together comprise more than half the population of the country) in 2014. The Uniform 
Law, if and when generally adopted, would come close to the creation of Australia-wide legal 
professions, albeit with the regulatory structure administered locally by State or Territory 
professional bodies. 
The requirements of a jurisdiction: administrative arrangements and other institutions 
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It will be apparent that, on this account of what it is to be a jurisdiction, the other institutions 
cited as necessary for a jurisdiction are, at best, merely those which are associated with 
jurisdiction-status. It is difficult to see how it can be seriously argued that a law commission or 
a separate police, prison or probation service are necessary for jurisdiction-hood,45 although 
it may well be that the existence of a separate jurisdiction would facilitate their devolution. The 
Welsh Government, for instance, argued in its evidence to Silk that policing should be 
devolved, but that, at least at that time, there should not be a separate jurisdiction.46 
The administration of the courts themselves is also an executive function, the performance of 
which does not have to lie with the executive coterminous with the jurisdiction. Differential 
administration is inevitable in apex courts/appeal courts. In Northern Ireland, justice functions, 
which included the administration of the courts, were not initially devolved as part of the current 
settlement. During the period from 1999 until they were devolved in 2010,47 the UK 
administered the courts of the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, as indeed they had done 
throughout the direct rule period from 1972 to 1999. It can hardly be said that the separate 
existence of the Northern Ireland jurisdiction was thereby compromised during those periods. 
Similarly, in Canada, the section 96 courts are administered by the Province, and the judiciary 
appointed by the Federal Government.  
The requirements of a jurisdiction: law 
7KHILQDO³FKDUDFWHULVWLF´DGYDQFHGE\-RQHVDQG:LOOLDPVLVD³GLVWLQFWERG\RIODZ´&HUWDLQO\
a jurisdiction must administer law within the reach of the court to be a jurisdiction, but it is not 
obvious that it must be, at least always, a distinct body of law. 
There are existing examples of such only partial distinctiveness. The UK Services jurisdiction 
does have its own law, in that the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides for a significant suite of 
armed forces only offences, such as aiding an enemy, mutiny and malingering.48 However, 
most of the offences dealt with, at least at the level of the Courts Martial Appeal Court, are 
criminal offences under the law of England and Wales. Section 42 of the 2006 Act provides 
that, in addition to the service-only offences, it is a service offence to commit an act which 
would be an offence under the law of England and Wales. Section 42 is a jurisdiction-
conferring provision. Its effect is to confer on the services jurisdiction the criminal law of 
England and Wales. The rationale for a service jurisdiction lies in the need to provide law to a 
distinct group of people, who cannot be territorially defined, and the desirability of its own 
distinctive institutions. There would be no conceptual difficulty were the whole of the substance 
of services law to be identical to the law of England and Wales. 
A recent decision of the UK Supreme Court has created a novel form of law sharing between 
the UK territorial jurisdictions and the other jurisdictions exercised at apex level by the Privy 
Council. In Willers v Joyce and Another,49 the Court created a new procedure empowering the 
Privy Council to certify that a finding in a case concerning an overseas jurisdiction is also to 
be considered the law of England and Wales (or one of the other jurisdictions).  
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Australia provides a striking example of jurisdictions sharing law, another qualification to the 
supposed characteristic of distinctiveness of law. It is worth setting out the Australian 
experience, because in addition to providing an example of the same law lying within the reach 
of more than one system of courts (ie non-distinctiveness of law), it may be institutionally 
interesting in the context of Welsh devolution. 
Australia has developed a practice by which the courts in one jurisdiction are vested with the 
power to decide issues that arise in the law of another jurisdiction. From the establishment of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, the federal Parliament was empowered by the constitution to 
vest in state courts jurisdiction in federal matters.50 Most of the matters reserved for the 
Commonwealth were invested in State courts in the Judiciary Act 1903, section 38. Further, 
the High Court has the power to remit cases within its jurisdiction, on a case by case basis, to 
state courts.51 
The process was taken a step further in 1987 when a system of cross-vesting was established 
by the passage of Jurisdiction of Courts (Cross-Vesting) Acts at both Commonwealth and 
state level. These provided for the first-instance Federal courts (the Federal Court and Family 
Court) to also exercise state jurisdictions, as well as cross-vesting between states and 
territories. The system operated for about eight years until the High Court found it to be in part 
unconstitutional in Re Wakim: Ex parte McNally.52 Specifically, there was no power in the 
constitution for state jurisdiction to be vested in federal courts.  
In Re Wakim the efficiency and effectiveness of cross-vesting was not in doubt. Indeed, Kirby 
-¶VGLVVHQWLQJMXGJPHQWODLGFRQVLGHUDEOHVWUHVVRQWKHFOHDUDGYDQWDJHVRIWKHVFKHPHDV
evidenced by the unanimity of the state and Commonwealth governments who appeared as 
interveners.53 
There is a similar example, albeit writ very small indeed, in England and Wales. English 
magistrates, in some circumstances, administer the law of Scotland, when dealing with salmon 
poaching offences on the river Tweed.54 
What is required for a jurisdiction? 
A court or system of courts is fundamental to the existence of a jurisdiction; and a judiciary is 
constitutive of a court.  But the core of jurisdiction as a concept lies in the reach of the court, 
and that is constituted by a third and distinct set of legal rules. These specify the disputes, 
claims, questions and authorisations which it is empowered to decide or make. All three sets 
of rules are necessary.  
In England and Wales, the High Court emerged from English courts which themselves 
SURFHHGHGIURPWKHPRQDUFK³DOOODZIXOMXULVGLFWLRQLVGHULYHGIURPDQGPXVWEHWUDFHGWRWKH
royal authority. Any exercise « of jurisdiction not so authorised, is an usurpation of the 
prerogative, and a resort WRIRUFHXQZDUUDQWHGE\ODZ´DVWKH+RXVHRI/RUGVFRXOGVD\LQD
case as late as 1867.55 7KDWFDVHFRQFHUQHGWKHMXULVGLFWLRQRIWKH/RUG0D\RU¶V&RXUW6LQFH
then, the courts have all been put on a statutory footing, as is neatly illustrated by the 
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subsequent history of that court ± following amalgamation by statute with another City court 
in 1920,56 it was assimilated to the statutory county court system in 1971.57   
The consolidating statute which now houses the creation of the higher courts (by way of the 
Supreme Court of Judicature Acts 1873 and 1925 and the Courts Act 1971) is the Senior 
Courts Act 1981. That Act provides WKDW³WKH6HQLRU&RXUWVRI(QJODQGDQG:DOHVVKDOOFRQVLVW
of the Court of Appeal, the HiJK&RXUWRI-XVWLFHDQGWKH&URZQ&RXUW´LQVHFWLRQDQGLQ
VHFWLRQVDQGSURYLGHV WKDW WKH&RXUWRI$SSHDODQG WKH+LJK&RXUW UHVSHFWLYHO\ ³VKDOO
FRQVLVWRI´WKHUHOHYDQWMXGJHV%XWWKHTXRWDWLRQDERYHIURPVHFWLRQFRQWLQXHV³HDFKKDYLQJ
such jurLVGLFWLRQDVLVFRQIHUUHGRQLWE\RUXQGHUWKLVRUDQ\RWKHU$FW´ 
Thus, at least in modern times, it is legislation that creates courts, establishes their judiciaries 
and gives them reach. 
These sets of rules ± creation, constitution and reach ± are not only conceptually separable, 
but are often actually separated in practice.  
In Canada, as we have seen, it is provincial legislation that creates the senior provincial 
section 96 courts, and provides their reach rules, but the Federal Government that appoints 
the judiciary. 
In Scotland, the Court of Session was established from the first by statute, in 1532,58 as 
6FRWODQG HPHUJHG IURP LWV ³'DUN $JH´ RI OHJDO KLVWRU\59 While much reformed since, the 
FRXUW¶VFUHDWLRQUXOHUHPDLQVOHJDOO\FRQWDLQHGLQWKHVWLOO in-force words of the Act of 1532. Its 
constitution rules, however, are now contained in the consolidating Court of Session Act 
1988.60 And over time, the Court has absorbed, by statute, other courts, and their 
jurisdictions,61 so that its reach rules can be found in numerous statutes, as well as, still, in the 
common law.62 
The identification of these three sets of rules helps elucidate the usage of the term 
³MXULVGLFWLRQ´ ,Q WKHVWDWXWRU\SURYLVLRQVTXRWHGDERYH ³MXULVGLFWLRQ´ UHIHUVVWULFWO\ WRZKDW ,
have termed reach rules. When required to describe what I have been referring to as the 
³WHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQV´WKH&RQVWLWXWLRQDO5HIRUP$FWVHFWLRQUHIHUV (in common with 
many other statutes) WR³WKHVHSDUDWHOHJDOV\VWHPVRIWKHSDUWVRIWKH 8QLWHG.LQJGRP´DQG
³jurisdiction´ is reserved for the reach rules in section 40. However, even Parliamentary 
counsel are not wholly consistent ± in the Wales Bill, the list of reserved matters include a 
SDUDJUDSKKHDGHG³VLQJOHOHJDOMXULVGLFWLRQRI(QJODQGDQG:DOHV´ZKLFKUHVHUYHVFourts and 
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WULEXQDOVDQG MXGJHVDQG LQGHHG³FLYLORUFULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJV´ MXGLFLDO UHYLHZDQGSULYDWH
international law.63  
:HILQG WKHQERWKQDUURZDQGZLGHUXVDJHVRI WKH ³MXULVGLFWLRQ´7KHVWULFWQDUURZXVDJH
confines it to reach rules. But a broader usage is also linguistically acceptable. That usage 
includes creation and constitution rules, and it is the three together that constitute the 
³WHUULWRULDOMXULVGLFWLRQV´ 
Reach rules of the courts of England and Wales 
The reach rules of the courts of England and Wales are numerous and protean. The generalist 
civil courts of first instance have a broad jurisdiction conferred on them ± thus the County 
Court Act 1984 confers a general jurisdiction in relation to contract and tort, land law and 
various equitable jurisdictions64 (among others). The general jurisdiction of the High Court is 
inherited. The Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 created the High Court out of a series of 
SUHGHFHVVRUVDQGVHFWLRQ³WUDQVIHUUHGWRDQGYHVWHGLQ´WKHQHZFRXUWWKHMXULVGLFWLRQVRI
the old; a formulation repeated in the first consolidation, in 1925.65 Now, the Senior Court Act 
 FRQIHUV LQ D VHFWLRQ KHDGHG ³JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ RI WKH +LJK &RXUW,´ ³DOO VXFK «
MXULVGLFWLRQV«DVZHUHH[HUFLVDEOHE\LWLPPHGLDWHO\EHIRUHWKHFRPPHQFHPHQWRIWKLV$FW´.66  
But, in addition, innumerable Acts dealing with any number of subjects confer narrower and 
more specific jurisdictions. There is no list. By way of illustration, between the start of 2015 
and the time of writing, 11 Acts have conferred new jurisdictions on the High Court, some 
numerous.67 
The position with newer courts is not much simpler. Thus the primary appellate jurisdiction of 
the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal is set out in the 1981 Act. But all previous jurisdictions 
are saved in a manner similar to the High Court; and the core jurisdiction of the Criminal 
Division remains in the Criminal Appeal Act 1966. The (troublesome) distinction between the 
jurisdiction of the Criminal Division and the High Court is also set out in the 1981 Act,68 and 
there are various other jurisdictions provided for elsewhere.69  
The Crown Court was created in 1971, and its creation and constitution rules are now in the 
Senior Courts Act 1981.70 Its core jurisdiction ± exclusively to try proceedings on indictment ± 
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is also found there.71 But, while the procedure for proceedings on indictment are now 
statutory,72 the indictment remains a creature of ancient common law.73 
The reach rules I have referred to above are those which relate to the definition of the disputes 
and other matters to be decided by the court, but reach rules include those that limit the 
geographic reach of the court. Traditionally, these were purely a matter of domestic law; and 
they remain so in respect of criminal liability, and non-European jurisdictions in respect of civil 
law.74 The conflict of law rules in relation to civil law in European jurisdictions are now the 
subject matter of EU legislation, transposed into domestic law.75 
 
Pointers towards a Welsh jurisdiction 
I turn now to some of the implications of this account of jurisdiction for the debate about a 
Welsh jurisdiction. Exploiting the potential flexibilities of jurisdictions arising out of the 
discussion above, the aim is to indicate, necessarily at a very general level, how a Welsh 
jurisdiction could be created without the entire panoply of institutions and structures which 
have generally been thought necessary for jurisdiction status. In doing so, I draw on the 
distinction between the rules relating to creation, constitution by a judiciary, and reach. 
Before doing so, it is necessary, however, to give a little detail about the current developments 
in devolution to Wales. At present, the legislative competence of the National Assembly for 
Wales set out in Part 4 of the Government of Wales Act 2006 works on a conferred powers 
model ± the Act sets out the broad policy areas legislative competence for which is devolved. 
As part of post Scottish Independence referendum devolution developments, the Government 
SURPLVHGD³UHVHUYHGSRZHUV´PRGHOIRU:DOHVDVWDWHPHQWRIGHYROXWLRQWKDWSURFHHGVE\
saying what is not devolved rather than what is, and this is the form taken in the current Wales 
Bill, shortly to receive Royal assent (and the preceding draft Bill). 
Under the current, conferred powers model, provided Assembly legislation related to the 
specified subject-matter, it could change the law. The move to the greater specificity of a 
reserved model, however, created difficulties in defining the relationship between devolved 
matters and the general law. The original draft bill adopted a blanket reservation of criminal 
law (including civil penalties) DQG³SULYDWH ODZ´³WKH ODZRIFRQWUDFWDJHQF\EDLOPHQW WRUt, 
XQMXVWLILHG HQULFKPHQW DQG UHVWLWXWLRQ SURSHUW\ WUXVWV DQG VXFFHVVLRQ´76 mitigated by 
provisions allowing amendments where necessary for legislation in devolved areas.77 The bill 
as introduced to Parliament swept away this much-criticised ³QHFHVVLW\WHVW´DQGVXEVWLWXWHG
a more nuanced approach. The Wales Bill adopts broadly the same structure in relation to 
private law, which remains wholly reserved, but subject to a provision allowing modification to 
the law where the purpose of the modification relates to a devolved matter, a broader test than 
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necessity. In relation to criminal law, however, the bill reserves not the whole field, but four 
specific categories of offences (broadly, treason, homicide and serious offences against the 
person, sexual offences and perjury) DQGFHUWDLQRIWKH³JHQHUDOSDUWV´RIWKHFULPLQDOODZOLNH
criminal responsibility and the meaning of mens rea terms.78  
A possible more general answer would have been to have removed the general restrictions 
on private law and criminal law/civil penalties altogether. This would have amounted to a 
significant extension of substantive devolution of legislative competence ± the non-reservation 
of some categories of substantive criminal law goes some way, but perhaps not very far, in 
that direction. The Parliamentary process has failed to amend these provisions. Nonetheless, 
the option of a general policy of not reserving criminal and private law will remain on the table 
for the future. 
While the distribution of legislative responsibility between state and sub-state units has no 
necessary relationship with the structure of state and sub-state jurisdictions, it can clearly have 
an effect on what is desirable in policy terms. There may be practical reasons for in general 
aligning legislative competence and jurisdiction; and it is, at least, a better conceptual fit to do 
so, even if only for reasons of transparency. In some circumstances, however, the relationship 
may be more complicated. In particular, it may be that drawing the right jurisdictional line 
assists the delineation of legislative competence; or, contrariwise, the delineation of 
competence may make coincidence of jurisdiction pointless. I return to this in relation to reach 
rules below 
My purpose is not to engage in principle with the level of substantive devolution. Nonetheless, 
in the particular circumstances of the options for the Welsh devolution settlement at the 
moment, it is necessary to consider jurisdictional design on the basis of both possibilities ± 
non-reservation of criminal and private law, and continued (at least, largely) reservation.  
A Welsh Jurisdiction: Creation rules  
General devolution of private and criminal law would argue for a more expansive form of Welsh 
jurisdiction. As it happens, the Welsh Government¶s draft Government and Laws in Wales bill 
adopts just such an approach, although its approach to devolved powers is different.79 The 
draft bill abolishes the existing senior courts (Court of Appeal, High Court and Crown Court) 
and county and family courts and in their stead creates (similar) senior courts, county and 
family courts for England and for Wales. 7KHUHLVQRH[SUHVVSURYLVLRQIRUPDJLVWUDWHV¶FRXUWV
on the basis that they already operate on a territorial basis, and would apply the law of the 
new Welsh jurisdiction (no doubt after the issue of separate commissions of the peace).80 A 
broadly similar approach, of de jure abolition and creation, was adopted in the Government of 
Ireland Act 1920.81  
But even with this maximalist approach, as we have seen, the new Welsh jurisdiction need be 
no more monolithic and ubiquitous than the existing territorial jurisdictions. And a merits-based 
consideration of some courts and tribunals might still result in persisting England and Wales 
jurisdictions. Just as there are GB and UK tribunal jurisdictions, it may well be sensible for, 
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say, the First-tier Tribunal land registration jurisdiction, or the War Pensions chamber, to 
remain on an England and Wales basis. Even with general devolution of civil and criminal law, 
some parts of the High Court might retain an England and Wales jurisdiction. For instance, 
the subject matter of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 would remain reserved under current 
plans,82 and that subject matter provides the jurisdictions of the Court of Protection. If there 
are sufficiently compelling practical reasons, based on expertise and administrative ease, 
there would be no reason of principle for it not to retain an England and Wales jurisdiction. 
One might also question the necessity for a Welsh Admiralty jurisdictions, for example. 
However, if there is no further devolution, there are alternatives to the (comparatively) 
ZKROHVDOHMXULVGLFWLRQSURSRVHGE\WKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶s draft bill. In particular, there might 
be advantages in a system comprising both an England and Wales jurisdiction, and a Welsh 
only jurisdiction, differentiating the two by subject-matter reach rules. I discuss how this might 
work below. The implication of such an approach for creation rules is that the necessary courts 
for a Welsh jurisdiction would be created de novo, without the concomitant abolition of the 
England and Wales courts. And, on this model, it would not be necessary to replicate all courts. 
In the absence of general devolution of criminal law, for instance, there may be no need to 
FUHDWHD:HOVK&URZQ&RXUWRUPDJLVWUDWHV¶ courts, on the assumption that such devolution 
as there is of criminal law in the Wales Bill will only be used for regulatory purposes. 
Where new courts are created alongside existing courts, there would, of course, be no need 
to house them in distinct buildings. The Welsh jurisdiction could operate in the same buildings 
(and, as we will see, using the same judiciary), in much the same way that the Courts Marital 
Appeal Courts functions at present.  
A Welsh Jurisdiction: Constitution rules ± the judiciary 
The obvious solution to the creation of a judiciary for a Welsh jurisdiction ± and that adopted 
E\WKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGUDIWELOO± is that the two new jurisdictions should share a judiciary. 
Unlike creation and reach rules, the considerations in relation to the judiciary appear the same, 
regardless of the extent of a Welsh jurisdiction.  
I set out above examples of judiciary-sharing ± at apex and appeal level, by cross-vesting in 
Australia, de facto in Jersey ± that show that judiciary sharing is not conceptually incompatible 
with jurisdiction-hood. I know of no example of a wholly shared judiciary at all levels, but there 
is no reason in principle why it should not be possible. 
I suggest three options for such sharing. The first two would be seamless sharing ± that is, 
sharing a judiciary capable of sitting in both jurisdictions without separate appointment. There 
would be a single judicial structure spanning the two new jurisdictions, but with different 
governance arrangements. The third would be de facto sharing, in which the judiciary were 
common because both systems independently appointed the same people.  
The least-radical approach would be for the current England and Wales judicial system, as 
currently constituted, to serve both jurisdictions. Considered in terms of devolved 
competences, the governmental function of providing a judiciary for both the England and the 
Wales jurisdictions would be non-devolved. The UK Government would continue to be 
responsible in policy terms for the judiciary and to pay for it. This is the approach adopted in 
WKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VELOOIRUWKHLPPHGLDWHFUHDWLRQRID:HOVKMXULVGLFWLRQ 
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This would share some of the characteristics of the Canadian system of federal appointment 
to provincial, as well as federal, jurisdictions, although the federally-appointed provincial 
judiciary are not shared. 
The second seamless option would be to turn the judiciary of England and Wales into a trans-
jurisdictional body, serving both new jurisdictions. All judges of what would be formally a new 
institution would be capable of sitting in both jurisdictions. Judicial leadership would be 
unchanged, and there would be no need to consider the institution of a cross-vesting scheme 
on the Australian model, because all judges sitting in either jurisdiction would be empowered 
to make a judgement in the other, should the necessity arise.  
The trans-jurisdictional organisation model, however, would present sponsorship/governance 
problems. It would be unrealistic to expect the UK Government, acting for the English 
jurisdiction with 94.6% of the joint population, to have no greater voice in the governance of 
the new institution than Wales. Setting up governance arrangements to reflect such 
circumstances would be a novel undertaking; but not an impossible one. At the very least, the 
Welsh Government would have de jure joint responsibility, and a formal involvement in policy 
decisions, even if, in the end, the English voice would be determinative in the event of 
disagreement. 
Under the third, de facto joint model, the Welsh judiciary would come from the joint 
appointment of judges of the English judiciary, and possibly other judges from other 
jurisdictions.  
On the ground, such a system might not look very different from the seamless models. There 
are, however, some significant differences. There would be separate provision for judicial 
leadership, and it might be desirable to make provision for cross-vesting with the English 
jurisdiction. Even if it would not be necessary to replicate the existing judicial appointments 
system, there would be some additional administrative costs to the Welsh Government of 
appointing judges.  
More fundamentally, such a system would be parasitic on the English (and other) system (or 
systems). That is its advantage ± it means that the Welsh Government does not have to 
replicate all the features already in place for the existing England and Wales jurisdiction, which 
would transfer to the English jurisdiction. For the system to reap the advantages of this 
parasitism, however, the statute would have to limit the qualifications necessary to become a 
Welsh judge to judicial appointment elsewhere. That need not be limited to the English 
jurisdiction, but in practice it would be largely reliant on that new big neighbour. Of the nine 
appointed members of the Jersey Court of Appeal, for instance, eight are members of the 
England and Wales bar.83 
This clearly has some disadvantages. It would be reasonable for someone wishing for a 
judicial career in Wales to join a seamless joint judicial structure to do so; less so for a 
prospective Welsh judge to first have to become an English (or Scottish, or Northern Irish etc) 
judge. One could object that this is a matter of perception rather than substance. But 
perception and symbolism are not unimportant. 
7KHLGHDRID³GLVWLQFWQRWVHSDUDWH´MXULVGLFWLRQIRU:DOHVLVIRXQGHGRQWKHLGHDRIVKDULQJD
judiciary. 
It is worth considering at this point the effect of a shared judiciary on that other issue, the 
structure of the legal professions. If a judiciary can be shared, so too can the legal professions 
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± indeed, with a shared judiciary, any other structure would seem inapt. If we strip away the 
assumption that a separate jurisdiction necessarily requires separate legal professionals, the 
only argument for separate professions rests on the extent of distinct law. But distinct law is a 
product of devolved legislative power, not the separation of the two jurisdictions. If it were 
really the case that distinct law required separate professions, the necessity would arise 
regardless of the separation of jurisdictions. And it is very unlikely to be necessary. If Australia 
can bring together eight professions with over a hundred years of distinct law, why should the 
English and Welsh professions need to part? 
A Welsh Jurisdiction: Reach rules 
In common with creation rules, it is necessary to consider reach rules in the context of both 
general legal devolution, that is devolution of the competence to make law amending private 
and criminal law generally, and without. 
If we assume general legal devolution, tKH:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶V(maximalist) draft bill provides 
a model. It recreates the existing reach rules of the superseded courts for the courts it creates 
and assigns to the Welsh jurisdiction. Those courWVDUHLWSURYLGHVWR³DSSly the law extending 
WR:DOHV´ZKHUHWKHdraft bill constitutes the substantive law of Wales as the pre-existing law 
of the England and Wales jurisdiction, excluding the law that applies only in England. Clause 
 LV KHDGHG ³GLYLVLRQ RI EXVLQHVV EHWZHHQ FRXUWV RI:DOHV DQG FRXUWV RI (QJODQG´ DQG
SURYLGHVWKDWWKH:HOVKFRXUWV³DUHWRDSSO\WKHODZH[WHQGLQJWR:DOHV´ 
7KHH[LVWLQJVHWRIUHDFKUXOHVWKDWGLVWULEXWHVFLYLOFDVHVEHWZHHQWKHFRXUWVRI³HDFKSDUWRI
the United KinJGRP´DUHFRQWDLQHGLQVFKHGXOHWRWKH&LYLO-XULVGLFWLRQDQG-XGJPHQWV$FW
1982. The schedule adapts (with minor changes) the rules contained in what is known as the 
Judgments Regulation,84 the now-current European conflict of laws instrument. The primary 
rule is that a person should be sued in the courts of the part of the UK in which they are 
domiciled, but a person may sue in the place where the subject matter of the contract lies ± 
where a contract was to be performed, where a tort or delict occurred, where a trust is located 
and so on.85 There are special rules for non-natural persons. There are numerous exceptions 
and qualifications, set out in schedule 4 and schedule 5. The creation of a Welsh jurisdiction 
would require the amendment of these rules to incorporate the Welsh jurisdiction (while the 
:HOVK*RYHUQPHQW¶VGUDIWGRHVQRWGRLWLWSURYLGHVDSRZHUWRGRVRZHUHWKHGUDIWDUHDO
bill rather than an incomplete and indicative one, it might well include these amendments86). 
In respect of criminal law, what is now the current case law in England and Wales would obtain 
± the Crown Court has jurisdiction to try proceedings on indictment where a substantial 
measure of the activities constituting the crime charged took place in England and Wales, 
except where the activities should, on the basis of international comity, be dealt with 
elsewhere.87 Scotland, similarly, requires D³WHUULWRULDOFRQQHFWLRQ´88 The leading case of Laird 
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v HM Advocate89 involved a fraudulent scheme, elements of which took place in Scotland and 
England. 
But in the absence of general legal devolution, something closer to a fit between jurisdiction 
and the distribution of legislative competence might be desirable. This is a common feature of 
federal jurisdictions. Thus, matters relating to areas of activity where legislative competence 
is devolved, such as housing, could fall within a Welsh jurisdiction. Conversely, a failure to 
devolve private law in general would argue for the retention of such matters as part of the 
England and Wales jurisdiction. 
But distributing jurisdiction in this way is problematic. The core difficulty is the 
incommensurability of policy categories and legal categories. It therefore applies equally to 
the specification of the law necessary for the exercise of legislative competence as it does to 
the specification of the law in a reach rule. The descriptions used for policy areas, for what the 
Supreme Court called ³REMHFWVRIOHJLVODWLYHDFWLYLW\´,90 do not necessarily map accurately onto 
the legal categories by which jurisdiction, or a fully autonomous definition of the law for the 
purpose of legislative competence, may most effectively be defined.  
To take one example³KRXVLQJ´LVDpolicy area. As a tradition description of a policy area, it 
includes, among other things, the regulation of rented accommodation. Legally, the respective 
rights of landlords and tenants and the law relating to tenancy terms, is part of the law of 
landlord and tenant. But landlord and tenant law also includes commercial renting; and long 
residential tenancies. Neither commercial property nor matters such as leasehold 
enfranchisement or service charge disputes in long leases are traditionally seen as included 
ZLWKLQ³KRXVLQJSROLF\´± thus, they are within the departmental responsibility of the Ministry of 
-XVWLFH DV SDUW RI FLYLO ODZ QRW WKH ³KRXVLQJ´ VXEMHFW RZQHG E\ WKH 'HSDUWPHQW IRU /RFDO
Government and Communities. 
Contrariwise, the public law system for controlling overcrowding, or regulating the physical 
standard of short-term rented property, LVSDUWRIWKH³KRXVLQJ´SROLF\VXEMHFWEXWQRWODQGORUG
and tenant as a legal category. 
It is by no means impossible to describe, and chop up, the legal categories relevant to 
devolved subject matters in this way, even if it is a substantial task (and one more appropriate 
to a conferred power model than a reserved powers one). It is highly unlikely that the fit would 
be exact in all circumstances. And it would also be necessary in some areas for the two 
jurisdictions ± England and Wales and Wales ± to share jurisdiction. So it is one possible way 
of defining a Welsh jurisdiction that is close-to-coincident with legislative competence. 
But there would also be another possible approach to such a partial Wales jurisdiction. The 
optimal reach rules for a Welsh jurisdiction co-existing with a continuing England and Wales 
jurisdiction may not the same as the optimal limits on the competence of the National 
Assembly. In other words, it might be possible to differentiate a smaller number of legal 
categories to be judicially reserved than need be legislatively reserved.  
In Canada, the federal first instance jurisdiction is much more confined than the legislative 
competence of the Parliament. Most federal legislation is adjudicated by provincial courts. It 
would be possible to develop a similar, narrow list of matters judicially reserved (in Canada, 
judicial review of federal officialdom, copyright, trademarks, patents, admiralty, tax and 
citizenship), without regard to legislative competence (although here the position of the courts 
would be reversed ± the reserved matters would lie with the England and Wales jurisdiction, 
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in Wales). One attraction of this approach is that it is likely to be much easier to draft and 
administer. Another is that it would enable ± or require ± the UK Government to identify the 
legal areas in which it considered a persisting England and Wales really necessary, while 
relinquishing the rest. 
The options set out above for co-existing jurisdictions within Wales, differentiated by reach 
rules, could be described as retaining an England and Wales territorial jurisdiction and creating 
a Welsh territorial jurisdiction. Better, though, to simply describe which disputes different 
courts are empowered to adjudicate, as a Canadian lawyer will. 
Conclusion 
There may be any number of positive reasons for the introduction of a Welsh jurisdiction. A 
jurisdiction may solve problems with the formulation of devolved legislative and executive 
powers. It may bring the delivery of justice nearer to the people in Wales, and better reflect 
Welsh social, economic and cultural conditions. It may be apposite to reflect the growth and 
maturity of Wales as a polity. It may be symbolically important. Equally, there may be 
disadvantages to a Welsh jurisdiction, whether in terms of cost, or consistency, or even quality 
of adjudication.  
But it is only by adopting a better analysis of jurisdiction, and by understanding the flexibility 
of the concept, that we can open up the policy discussion beyond the inaccurate, one-size-
fits-all monolithic model of territorial jurisdictions. 
 
 
 
